

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 205596
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY PM/NPP:ALOCKE/S/P:JKAHAN:SBA
APPROVED BY PM/NPP:ALOCKE
D:DLAMB
AF:WBEDMONDSON
IO:GHELMAN
S/S-O:LRFLETSCHER
ACDA:MR.EINHORN
OES/NET/MR.BORIGHT/MR.COOPER
T:MR. WELCH
EUR/RPE:MR. HOMME

-----082951 270522Z /15

O 270503Z AUG 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY VIENNA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 205596

NODIS
DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS, PRETORIA FOR AMB. BOWDLER

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: MARR, US, ST, GW

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

USIAEA

1. WE ANTICIPATE EARLY APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERN-
MENT URGING IT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ADHERE TO THE
NPT. SINCE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE IAEA SAFE-
GUARDS IN SOUTH AFRICA PURSUANT TO NPT COULD TAKE

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CONSIDERABLE TIME, WE INTEND ALSO TO SEEK SOUTH AFRICAN
AGREEMENT TO IMMEDIATE APPLICATION OF SOME FORM OF INTERIM
SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENT SPECIFICALLY TO COVER THE VALINDABA
PILOT ENRICHMENT PLANT.

2. WE WISH TO AVOID, THROUGH ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENT,
CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US IS THE GUARANTOR OF

SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR BEHAVIOR. IN ADDITION, WE DO NOT WISH TO TAKE ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO UNDERCUT THE IAEA'S SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE AREA OF SAFEGUARDS, AND WE DO NOT WISH TO ADVERSELY AFFECT SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF NPT SAFEGUARDS UNDER REGULAR AGENCY PROCEDURES IN SOUTH AFRICA. FOR THOSE REASONS, WE BELIEVE IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO FIND A WAY FOR THE AGENCY TO PLAY EARLY AND EFFECTIVE ROLE IN FORMULATING AND IMPLEMENTING

AN INTERIM SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENT FOR THE VALINDABA PLANT, SHOULD SAG ACCEPT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. SPEED IN ESTABLISHING SUCH SAFEGUARDS IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY AND THE PERCEPTION THAT SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT PRODUCE AND STOCKPILE UNSAFEGUARDED HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PENDING APPLICATION OF NPT SAFEGUARDS.

3. WE URGENTLY NEED YOUR JUDGMENT ON FOLLOWING QUESTIONS (ON WHICH WE RECOGNIZE YOU MAY HAVE NO DEFINITIVE INFORMATION) AS WELL AS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION YOU BELIEVE RELEVANT. YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT AT THIS TIME APPROACH AGENCY OFFICIALS OR INDICATE TO THEM IN ANY WAY OUR ANTICIPATED MOVES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

A. GIVEN SOUTH AFRICAN RECENT REJECTION FROM GOVERNING BOARD, DO YOU ANTICIPATE BASIC RELUCTANCE ON PART OF AGENCY FOR POLITICAL REASONS TO ACCOMMODATE A POTENTIAL REQUEST
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PAGE 03 STATE 205596

FOR A SPECIAL IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA?

B. WHATEVER YOUR VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS, WOULD AGENCY BE IN A POLITICAL POSITION TO NEGOTIATE AND IMPLEMENT AN NPT-TYPE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICA?

C. WHAT SPECIAL INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS (E.G. UNILATERAL SUBMISSION) COULD BE EMPLOYED FOR APPLYING SAFEGUARDS TO PILOT ENRICHMENT FACILITY?

D. WOULD SUCH ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARILY REQUIRE BOARD OF GOVERNORS APPROVAL AND, IF SO, WHAT MINIMUM TIME DELAY CAN BE ANTICIPATED BEFORE FORMAL APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION?

E. BEFORE ANY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT COULD BE APPROVED AND FORMALLY IMPLEMENTED, COULD THE AGENCY MAINTAIN A "PRESENCE" AT THE VALINDABA FACILITY THAT WOULD ENABLE IT TO PERFORM FUNCTIONS WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES, WOULD NONETHELESS PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE? ON WHAT BASIS WOULD SUCH AGENCY

PRESENCE BE JUSTIFIED (E.G., SAG/IAEA DISCUSSIONS ON
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITY ATTACHMENTS OR
ALTERNATIVELY JOINT SAG/IAEA RESEARCH ON ENRICHMENT PLANT
SAFEGUARDS INVOLVING DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENT STAFF)?

F. COULD AGENCY EXPERTS, WITH OR WITHOUT US, PARTICIPATE
IN POSSIBLE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS AND/OR ON-SITE VISITS
WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IN
CONNECTION WITH US-SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS TO REACH
UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUE OF INTERIM VALINDABA SAFEGUARDS?

G. POLITICAL AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, IS THE
AGENCY CAPABLE OF INITIATING QUICK, CREDIBLE SAFEGUARDS
AT VALINDABA THAT WOULD NOT BE SO INTRUSIVE AS TO CAUSE AN
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OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIABLE SOUTH AFRICAN RELUCTANCE TO
ACCEPT THEM?

H. WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS ARISING EITHER FROM
PRETORIA OR FROM VIENNA IN CONNECTION WITH COMPOSITION
OF IAEA INSPECTION TEAMS INVOLVED IN VALINDABA SAFEGUARDS,
WHETHER ON INTERIM BASIS OR UNDER FORMAL NPT SYSTEM? CHRISTOPHER

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APPROVED BY: S/S-O:LFLEISCHER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 205596

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FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION VIENNA, INFO PRETORIA FROM STATE
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QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 205596

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UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
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Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NPT, NUCLEAR TESTS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 27-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Enclosure: PRETORIA FOR AMB BOWDLER
Executive Order: X3
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Expiration:
Film Number: P850070-2660
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Handling Restrictions: n/a
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SAS ID: 1458584
Secure: OPEN
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Subject: SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
TAGS: MARR, PARM, MNUC, US, ST, GE, SF
To: VIENNA PRETORIA MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d7d9df51-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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